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Abstract
Fiscal policy is examined in a model of an open economy which is charac-
terised by unemployment caused by eﬃciency wages. It is shown that the con-
ventional conclusion, according to which mobile capital is untaxed in the presence
of wage taxation, is not generally valid. A positive capital tax allows to indi-
rectly tax proﬁts, thereby mitigating unemployment through the reduction in
the eﬀective tax burden on labour. It is argued that these policy conclusions are
qualitatively unaﬀected by the cause of unemployment. Moreover, the welfare
loss from labour market imperfections increases when tax bases become interna-
tionally mobile, which suggests an increasing relevance of domestic labour market
reforms.
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The important clariﬁcation of the Production Eﬃciency theorem of Diamond and Mir-
rlees (1971) in optimal taxation is that taxes which distort production decisions are
dominated by taxes on consumption in an environment where frictions other than the
non-availability of lump-sum taxation do not exist. Applied to the issue of interna-
tional taxation, the Production Eﬃciency theorem implies that the government in an
open economy abstains from source-based capital taxation and uses either commodity
taxes or taxes on proﬁts to pay for the cost of national public goods.
Adopting the eﬃciency wage framework by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), this pa-
per analyses whether labour market imperfections alter this result. It is assumed that
ﬁrms cannot perfectly monitor the eﬀort of their employees and, therefore, have to
pay an eﬃciency wage in order to prevent shirking. The equilibrium of the eﬃciency
wage economy is characterised by a wage which exceeds the market-clearing level. Ac-
cordingly, unemployment results. This generates the necessary incentives for employed
workers to provide the amount of eﬀort which is required by ﬁrms.
This paper shows that tax policy may be used to counteract the distortions caused
by labour market imperfections. A reduction in the tax on labour income can raise
output through an increase in employment and, thereby, mitigates the eﬃciency losses
due to unemployment. This employment eﬀect of the wage tax cannot be reproduced
by the source-based capital tax. We show that the capital tax, however, is used as a
substitute for a proﬁt tax in the absence of the latter.
Issues of optimal taxation in the presence of mobile capital and of labour market
imperfections have previously been analysed almost exclusively in collective bargaining
frameworks.1 While the qualitative impact of labour taxes in collective bargaining and
eﬃciency wage models is often the same (cf., inter alia, Pissarides (1998), Picard and
Toulemonde (2001), Goerke (2002)), this equivalence has not yet been established for
taxes on capital and wage taxation in the presence of mobile capital.
The present paper makes three contributions: ﬁrst, it shows that the qualitative re-
sults with respect to optimal tax rates are not aﬀected by the nature of the labour mar-
ket imperfection. Second, the paper provides a simple workhorse model for analysing
1See, among others, Fuest and Huber (1999), Boeters and Schneider (1999), Koskela and Sch¨ ob
(2002) and Richter and Schneider (2001). Wilson (1990) provides - to our knowledge - the only analysis
of optimal taxation in which unemployment is caused by eﬃciency wages.
1issues of optimal taxation in the presence of labour market imperfections. The applica-
tion of Occam’s Razor suggests that future analyses of relevant questions can proﬁtably
exploit the features of the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) shirking framework. Third, the
model indicates that ineﬃciencies on the labour market itself do not justify measures
of international tax harmonization, although the welfare losses from labour market
imperfections might rise when capital becomes mobile.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. We discuss ﬁscal
policy in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a small open economy which competes for mobile capital on an international
market taking world-market prices as given. The country is inhabited by a large number
of identical individuals. We allow individuals to choose their work eﬀort and suppose
that capital and labour supply are ﬁxed. Eﬀort choices are an employee’s private
information. Since providing eﬀort creates disutility, employees have an incentives to
deliver as little eﬀort as possible. For simplicity, let us assume that eﬀort can only
take two values, zero or the positive and exogenously given level required by ﬁrms.
To provide employees with an incentive not to shirk and to deliver the required eﬀort,
the ﬁrm pays a wage in excess of the wage paid by other ﬁrms. The wage diﬀerential
generates a loss to a worker who is caught providing too little eﬀort and ﬁred for doing
so. The desire of each individual ﬁrm to exceed the equilibrium wage results in an
eﬃciency wage which surpasses the market clearing level. A wage in excess of the
market clearing level entails unemployment. Thus, in equilibrium the possibility of
not being employed due to a job loss replaces the wage diﬀerential as the incentive
which induces workers to provide the required level of eﬀort. In line with the approach
which has generally been employed in the analysis of optimal taxation in the presence
of labour market imperfections, unemployment takes the form of the labour supply of
each individual worker only being in demand to a certain extent. This simpliﬁcation
allows to model the government’s optimisation problem in terms of a representative
agent.2
2See, for example, Fuest and Huber (1999), Koskela and Sch¨ ob (2002), Richter and Schneider
(2001) and Kleven and Sørensen (1999).
2Government
In each country a national authority (government) uses a source-based tax, ts, on capi-
tal k, wage taxation, tw, and a tax on proﬁts in order to ﬁnance the public good, g, and
unemployment beneﬁts, B. Let n depict the employment rate in the economy and as-
sume that each individual supplies one unit of labour but cannot be fully employed due
to the monitoring problem. Using the private good as the numeraire and formulating
our discussion in terms of unit taxation, the public budget constraint is
g + B (1 − n) = t
wn + t
sk + t
p, (1)
where tp is the revenue from proﬁt taxation.3
Households
As in the original model by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), individuals are risk-neutral,
inﬁnitely lived and discount future payments with the rate R, R > 0. They receive
interest income for each unit of their capital endowment at the going world interest
rate.4 An individual’s instantaneous utility, U, consists of the monetary income and
the utility derived from public good consumption, g, less the disutility from eﬀort, e,
which either conforms to the level required by ﬁrms, ¯ e > 0, or attains its minimum
level, e = 0. If an individual is employed, she will obtain the net wage, w −tw, receive
the return from the capital endowment, and any proﬁts net of proﬁt taxation, π. The
instantaneous utility of an individual who provides the required level of eﬀort can,
hence, be expressed as:
U (¯ e) = (w − t
w) + Rk + π − ¯ e + g. (2)
If the individual is unemployed, she will receive unemployment beneﬁts, B, instead
of the wage income and will not provide a positive level of eﬀort. Otherwise, the
instantaneous utility is independent of the employment status. A job loss can occur for
3Since our focus is on the eﬃciency properties of the optimal tax structure only, we will in line
with the previous literature (e.g., Koskela and Sch¨ ob, 2002) hold g and B constant in the following
analysis.
4The model implies that all individuals have the same ownership stake in domestic ﬁrms and that
domestic ﬁrms are fully owned by residents. The ﬁrst assumption allows to concentrate on the eﬃciency
eﬀects of taxation with unemployment in an open economy, the second implies that tax exportation
is irrelevant. See Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) for a discussion of tax policy with cross-ownership of
ﬁrms.
3two distinct reasons. Individuals might shirk and are caught doing so with probability c
per unit of time. Alternatively, there might be an exogenous shock which induces the
ﬁrm to dismiss workers. The respective probability for a job loss is b. The probabilities b
and c are suﬃciently small, implying that the time periods under consideration are
short, such that bc ≈ 0. In equilibrium individuals provide the level of eﬀort ¯ e.5
Accordingly, the expected life time utility of an employed non-shirker, V en, can be
expressed as V enR = w − tw − ¯ e + Rk + π + g + b(V u − V en). Solving for V en yields:
V
en =
U (¯ e) + bV u
b + R
. (3)
A shirker exerts an eﬀort level of e = 0 and loses the job with probability b + c, but is
otherwise identical to a non-shirker. The discounted utility stream of a shirker V es is
given by:
V
es =
w − tw + Rk + π + g + (b + c)V u
b + c + R
. (4)
A unemployed individual receives unemployment beneﬁts, B, in addition to the income
from his capital endowments and any proﬁt income. The probability that a worker
who has lost the job obtains a new one is denoted by the job acquisition rate, a. The
discounted utility stream of an unemployed V u, therefore, is
V
u =
B + Rk + π + g + aV en
a + R
. (5)
The wage which warrants a positive level of eﬀort by workers is deﬁned by V en ≥ V es.
Solving the equality for w yields:
w − t
w = B + ¯ e +
¯ e
c
(a + b + R). (6)
The eﬃciency wage is independent of capital income, proﬁts and the utility from the
public good because variations in these variables aﬀect the utility from shirking and
providing the required amount of eﬀort equally. A labour market equilibrium requires
that inﬂows into and outﬂows from unemployment are equal. Since labour supply is
normalised to unity and no worker shirks in equilibrium, this equilibrium condition is
bn = a(1 − n). Substituting in equation (6) yields:
w − t
w = B + ¯ e +
¯ e
c

b
1 − n
+ R

. (7)
5Since individuals are identical, shirking by one implies a choice of eﬀort e = 0 by all workers.
Given that a positive output requires a positive level of eﬀort under the standard assumption that
labour and capital are complements in production, e = 0 cannot represent an equilibrium.
4The eﬃciency wage rises with unemployment beneﬁts B, the required level of eﬀort ¯ e
and the interest rate R, since variations in these variables imply that the utility from
non-shirking rises relative to that of shirking. For later use it is helpful to explicitly
compute the utility stream from employment, V en, and unemployment, V u, as functions
of the exogenous variables. Substituting V u from equation (5) into the expression
for V en from equation (3) - or vice versa -, solving the resulting expression and using (7)
to replace for the market-clearing eﬃciency wage gives:
V
en = k +
g + B + π
R
+
¯ e
cR

bn
1 − n
+ R

= V
u +
¯ e
c
. (8)
In equilibrium, the (discounted) utility stream from being employed and not shirking
exceeds the utility of an unemployed worker by the present value of the disutility of ¯ e/c,
which a shirker - who is ﬁred with probability c - does not incur.
Production
Firms use capital, k, and eﬀective labour as inputs. Let us deﬁne eﬀective labour as
 := ¯ en and denote partial derivatives by subscripts for notational simplicity. The
production function f (,k) is homogeneous in {,k}, fii < 0 ∀i = ,k, and requires
positive inputs of capital and eﬀective labour to generate a nonzero level of output,
fij > 0 ∀i 6= j = ,k. The Euler theorem implies
¯ enf + kfk ≤ 0, ¯ enfk + kfkk ≤ 0, f
2
k − f fkk ≤ 0, (9)
where fk = fk from Young’s theorem. The equality in (9) will hold if the production
function is linear homogeneous, while the inequality will apply if the production func-
tion shows decreasing returns to scale. We can interpret the latter case as a situation in
which a third factor of production, say land, exists, which is in ﬁxed supply and gives
rise to pure proﬁts. We suppress the third factor whenever no ambiguities arise. Let
us assume that ﬁrms maximize after-tax proﬁts π := max[f (¯ en,k) − wn − Rk − tp].
Using (7) in the proﬁt deﬁnition, we obtain the following ﬁrst-order conditions
(n) : ¯ ef − B − ¯ e +
¯ e(b + R − nR)
c(n − 1)
− t
w = 0, (10a)
(k) : fk − R − t
s = 0. (10b)
Inspection of (10) shows that tp has no substitution eﬀect on the factor demand deci-
sions. There exists an equilibrium which entails a positive number of ﬁrms whenever
5the government chooses tp such that π ≥ 0. Let us now determine the response of ﬁrms
to a change in taxation. Diﬀerentiating (10) and the deﬁnition of net proﬁts we obtain

 

¯ e

¯ ef − b
c(n−1)2

¯ efk 0
¯ efk fkk 0
0 0 −1

 


 

dn
dk
dπ

 
 =

 

0 1 0
1 0 0
k n 1

 


 

dts
dtw
dtp

 
. (11)
We may deﬁne for convenience H := bfkk + c ¯ e(f2
k − ffkk)(n − 1)
2 < 0, where the
inequality follows from (9). Applying Cramer’s rule to (11) and maintaining the as-
sumptions used to derive (9) we ﬁnd
nts =
c
H
fk (n − 1)
2 < 0, ntw = −
c
¯ eH
fkk (n − 1)
2 < 0,
kts =
1
H
 
b − c ¯ ef (n − 1)
2
< 0, ktw =
1
H
 
cfk (n − 1)
2
< 0,
πts = −k < 0, πtw = −n < 0, (12)
and short inspection shows that ntp = ktp = 0,πtp = −1, which is suggestive from the
arguments given below (10).
Political Equilibrium
The government in each country maximizes the average discounted utility of an indi-
vidual nV en + (1 − n)V u subject to the per-capita revenue requirement (1), taking as
given the tax rates chosen by the other countries (Nash equilibrium). We may then
write the Lagrangian for the government in a given country as
L = nV
en + (1 − n)V
u − λ
 
g + B (1 − n) − t
wn − t
sk − t
p
, (13)
where λ is the Lagrange parameter on the revenue constraint. Using (8) to substitute
out for V en and V u in (13) we arrive at
L =
Rk + π(x) + g + B
R
+
e
cR

R +
b
1 − n(x)

n(x)
− λ

g + B
 
1 − n(x)

− t
wn(x) − t
sk(x) − t
p

. (14)
After diﬀerentiation we obtain the following ﬁrst-order conditions
Ltp = λ −
1
R
≥ 0, (15a)
Lts =
bents + (n − 1)2 (cπts + eRnts)
c(n − 1)2R
+ λ(k + B nts + t
skts + t
wnts) = 0, (15b)
Ltw =
bentw + (n − 1)2 (cπtw + eRntw)
c(n − 1)2R
+ λ(n + B ntw + t
sktw + t
wntw) = 0, (15c)
6where we have used the result ntp = ktp = 0 from the discussion of the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order
conditions (10) and πtp = −1 in the derivation of (15a). The interpretation of (15a) is
straightforward. A marginal increase in the proﬁt tax reduces net private consumption
exactly by the present value of the public revenue gained. If, however, tp is bounded,
then Ltp > 0 will hold, resulting in λ > 1/R. The interpretation is that the marginal
costs of public funds, measured by λ, increase when public expenditure exceeds the
revenue from proﬁt taxation. In this case, the equilibrium value of λ is given by the
ﬁrst-order conditions (15b) and (15c), according to which the government trades the
change in ‘private’ utility of residents (given by the fractions) against the utility from
an increase in tax revenue caused by a change in tw and ts. The latter is evaluated
at the equilibrium level of λ. Using the results given by (12) in (15) yields the set
of ﬁrst-order conditions which we employ subsequently to characterize the tax policy
chosen by the government in a world with tax competition and unemployment:
Ltp = λ −
1
R
≥ 0, (16a)
Lts =
α¯ efkk + kH
RH
+ λ
"
k +
tsb + c(n − 1)
2 (fk (B + tw) − ts¯ ef)
H
#
= 0, (16b)
Ltw = −
αfkk + nH
RH
+ λ
"
n −
c(n − 1)
2 (fkk (B + tw) − ts¯ efk)
¯ eH
#
= 0, (16c)
where we use α := b + (n − 1)
2 R in (16) for notational convenience.
3 Nationally optimal tax rates
In a ﬁrst step we characterize the tax structure under the assumption that proﬁt
taxation contributes to tax revenues. We subsequently analyse Nash equilibria either in
the absence of proﬁts or a tax on proﬁts. As a main result it turns out that governments
will abstain from using the source-based capital tax and will not distort production
decisions in a small open economy only if proﬁt taxation contributes to public revenues.
However, the source-based capital tax will be used if proﬁt taxation does not generate
public revenue, either for the reason that proﬁts taxes are not available or proﬁts are
zero. We start our discussion in a scenario in which the government has control over
the entire set of taxes. In this case it is possible to show:
7Proposition 1. Assume tp > 0 and that gross proﬁts are positive. Then, the govern-
ment in a small country does not use the source-based capital tax and subsidises wages
in an eﬃciency wage setting.
Proof: To prove the ﬁrst part of the Proposition, take a pair {ts,tw} such that the ﬁrst-
order conditions (16a) and (16b) are fulﬁlled. At that point we know
fkk
efkLts +Ltw = 0
must hold. We then solve the latter expression to obtain
λRt
s = (1 − λR)(kfkk + ¯ efkn). (17)
We ﬁnd from (16a) that λ = 1/R when proﬁt taxation is possible and, from (9), we
have kfkk + ¯ efkn < 0 when gross proﬁts are positive. Inspection of (17) then shows
that the government chooses not to tax mobile capital at source. To prove the second
part, we use λ = 1/R and ts = 0 in Ltw, which gives
c(n − 1)
2 t
w = −cB (n − 1)
2 − e
 
b + (n − 1)
2 R

.
The only solution is tw < 0 as required by the Proposition. 
The government does not use the source-based capital tax in the presence of proﬁt
taxation in order to avoid the distortion of international capital allocation caused by
taxing capital at source. Part of the revenue from proﬁt taxation is then used to
subsidise wages. The explanation is that a wage subsidy mitigates the distortion of the
domestic factor allocation caused in the presence of an imperfect labour market. Fiscal
policy is thus used to increase eﬀective labour input at a given gross wage, thereby
reducing the loss in domestic production.
An according result has been derived by Koskela and Sch¨ ob (2002, Prop. 2) in
a collective wage bargaining framework. They can, furthermore, show that the wage
subsidy suﬃces to eliminate unemployment and interpret this result as a conﬁrmation
of the ﬁnding by Guesnerie and Laﬀont (1978) that the output of a price maker should
be subsidised until the market price equals marginal costs in a ﬁrst-best world.6 Ac-
cordingly, if the tax rate on proﬁts is chosen optimally, the government can achieve
the ﬁrst-best allocation in a collective bargaining set-up. This is not feasible in the
6Related, Myles (1989) and Konishi (1990) show that ﬁscal policy can also be used to counteract
the eﬃciency losses generated by imperfect competition on output markets. Konishi (1990) shows in
a model where a competitive sector produces intermediate goods for a free-entry Cournot oligopoly
that welfare can be raised by the taxation of intermediate goods. In contrast, however, the tax system
should reduce the externalities caused by the monitoring problem on the labour market in our model.
8present shirking framework since the absence of unemployment is incompatible with
a positive level of eﬀort. In the seminal paper on tax competition in the presence of
unemployment, Wilson (1990) also analyses an eﬃciency wage model, but presumes a
two-sector economy, in which a monitoring problem exists solely in the primary sector.
Assuming utility functions which are non-linear in income and employing a rich set
of tax instruments Wilson shows that capital should not be taxed while wages and
employment are to be subsidised. Proposition 1 is, thus, robust to modiﬁcations of the
labour market structure. Accordingly, the qualitative equivalence of the ﬁnding that
wages should be subsidised while capital should not be taxed is obtained independently
of the exact modelling of the labour market provides and this is encouraging news in
terms of the policy relevance of this ﬁnding.
The analysis so far has been based on the assumption that revenues from proﬁt
taxation are positive. Assume next that the allocation described in Proposition 1 is
not feasible because ﬁrms do not make proﬁts. Then, the following result can be
established:
Proposition 2. Assume that the production function is constant returns to scale.
Then, the government in a small country characterised by eﬃciency wage setting does
not use the source-based capital tax and taxes wages to ﬁnance any positive revenue
requirement.
Proof: Gross proﬁts are zero when the production function is constant returns to scale,
implying that (9) holds with strict equality. Inspection of (17) then shows that ts = 0,
implying that wage taxation is used by the government to fulﬁl the public revenue
requirement in (1).
The intuition for Proposition 2 is that a distortion of international capital allocation
remains undesirable. However, in contrast to the assumptions on which Proposition 1
is based, the government has to tax wages in order to ﬁnance its outlays, despite the
positive wage and negative output consequences of a tax on labour income. Since the
government subsidises wages in the presence of proﬁt taxation, an immediate implica-
tion of Proposition 2 is that welfare is lower in the case of restricted proﬁt taxation.
In a collective wage setting framework, Richter and Schneider (2001) show that
the optimal tax on capital will be zero (positive/ negative) if the wage is unaﬀected
9by (rises/ falls with) the level of the capital input and taxes are set prior to wages.7
A capital subsidy will raise output and employment only if a higher capital input
reduces the market power of the owners of labour. In the present eﬃciency wage
framework, aggregate labour demand determines the net wage, which has to be such
that it guarantees a positive level of eﬀort (cf. equation (7)). However, the net wage is
not directly aﬀected by the capital choices of ﬁrms. This explains why capital should
not be subsidized in the present model.
The last scenario to be investigated is one in which proﬁts are positive but cannot
be taxed. We then have:
Proposition 3. Assume tp = 0 and that gross proﬁts are positive. Then, the gov-
ernment taxes capital at source in an eﬃciency wage world, even when the country is
small and capital supply inﬁnitely elastic.
Proof: Recall that in expression (9) the inequalility sign applies when gross proﬁts are
positive and that λ > 1/R when tp is bounded. Then, (17) can only be fulﬁlled for
ts > 0 as required by the Proposition. 
Proposition 3 stands in contrast to the results derived in Razin and Sadka (1991)
and Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991). This literature demonstrates that a small country,
which faces an inﬁnitely elastic supply of capital on the world market, taxes wage
income when the only tax on capital is source-based. The contrast in results to our
model can be explained by the following arguments. In models of perfect competition,
an increase in source-based capital taxation drives capital out of the country until the
marginal productivity of capital equals its tax inclusive costs. Hence, wages adjust in
order to maintain zero proﬁts in production. This clariﬁes that, in principle, the wage
eﬀect of an increase in source-based capital taxation can be replicated by a wage tax.
However, wage taxation avoids the loss in production eﬃciency caused by source-based
capital taxation. This makes intuitive that governments choose not to tax capital
at source in models where labour markets are competitive. In the present model,
an isolated increase of the source-based capital tax also causes a capital outﬂow and
induces a loss in production eﬃciency. Here, however, the tax burden of source-based
capital taxation is born by proﬁts. Hence, the source-based capital tax acts as an
indirect tax on proﬁts, which explains that this tax is used in the absence of a direct
7If taxes and wages are determined simultaneously, the tax on capital (labour) will be zero (nega-
tive). For further discussion also see Boeters and Schneider (1999), and Fuest and Huber (1999).
10proﬁt tax, even in a small open economy. This suggests that it is not the presence of
labour market imperfections which generates a positive source-based capital tax in the
ﬁrst place, but the existence of untaxed proﬁts.
Accordingly, diﬀerent results in the related literature can be explained by alterna-
tive assumptions with respect to labour market institutions. Richter and Schneider
(2001, Prop. 9) conclude in a model with collective wage setting that governments will
tax capital if wages are not decreasing with capital. However, the government may
ﬁnd it attractive to (implicitly) restrict wage claims by subsidising capital in an envi-
ronment where the wage rate decreases with the capital employed in ﬁrms. Related,
Koskela and Sch¨ ob (2002, Prop. 3) demonstrate in a model of wage bargaining that
we should observe source-based capital taxes on mobile capital in scenarios where it is
not proﬁtable to restrict the power of unions through a negative source-based capital
tax.
This leads us to the question about the optimal level of wage taxation in our model.
Intuitively, two counteracting eﬀects are relevant for the government when choosing this
tax. First, increasing the wage tax at a given level of public spending allows to reduce
the source-based capital tax. Second, the increase in wage taxation which is necessary
to keep the public budget balanced leads to an increase in the eﬃciency wage which
will lead to a higher level of unemployment and, at the same time, an increasing part
of proﬁts is not even taxed indirectly. We are not able to obtain unambiguous results
in a model which encompasses both positive and negative eﬀects from wage taxation.
The next Proposition summarizes our ﬁndings for the wage tax.
Proposition 4. Assume tp = 0 and that gross proﬁts are positive. In an eﬃciency
wage economy, the wage tax is the higher, the greater are the distortions of the tax
system (caused by source-based capital taxation and wage taxation) and the lower are
distortions on the labour market.
Proof: Recall that λ > 1/R when tp is bounded and that the equilibrium level of λ is
given by the simultaneous solution of the ﬁrst-order conditions for ts and tw. Consider
the ﬁctional case that the government has direct control over the gross wage. Is it
proﬁtable to increase wage taxation in this scenario? The ﬁrst-order condition says
Lw =
b ¯ enw + (n − 1)2 (cπw + ¯ eRnw)
c(n − 1)2R
+ λ

t
skw + (B + t
w)nw

= 0. (18)
11Inspection of ﬁrst-order conditions (18) and (15c) shows
Lw = −Ltw + λn = 0. (19)
Hence, Ltw − Lw = λn > 0 from ﬁrst-order condition (16a). The utility increase
obtained from increasing the wage tax is the higher, the higher the marginal costs of
public funds λ and the higher the level of employment n. 
The intuition for the result is as follows. First, notice that the wage tax and the
source-based capital tax both lead to an increase in unemployment as evidenced by (12)
under the standard assumption that labour and capital are complements in production.
This observation would suggest that the government chooses to use the two taxes to
pay for the costs of the public good. However, it is clarifying to see that both taxes
aﬀect employment through quite diﬀerent channels in our model. From the ﬁrst-order
condition of ﬁrms (10b) the marginal productivity of capital must rise when the source-
based capital tax is increased, leading to a reduction in capital’s contribution to proﬁts
from (12). For fk > 0, ﬁrms reduce labour demand since the eﬃciency wage has to be
held constant. In contrast, an increase in the wage tax leads to a rise in the marginal
productivity of labour from (10a) and thereby reduces employment (see (12)). The
argument makes clear that the welfare eﬀects of both taxes crucially depend on the
complementary assumption put on the production technology and on the level of ﬁrms’
proﬁts. If proﬁts are rather high, then it is suggestive from Proposition 1 that ﬁscal
authorities will use the revenue from indirect proﬁt taxation (through source-based
capital taxation) in order to subsidise labour. In contrast, if proﬁts are zero then
Proposition 2 will apply which explaines the absence of capital taxation.
We may now summarise our discussion with a concluding Proposition on the welfare
implications of tax harmonization:
Proposition 5. Starting from the tax structure in the Nash equilibrium, a simultaneous
increase of the source-based capital tax in all countries is welfare improving in an
eﬃcienvy wage economy, given the available taxes.
Proof: Recall that capital supply is given. Hence, if all countries are uniﬁed in a single
country then the source-based capital tax will be lump-sum. However, Proposition 1
clearly demonstrates that ﬁscal authorities choose not to levy the source-based capital
tax in scenarios with decentralized tax setting when the proﬁt tax is also available.
Since ﬁscal authorities are not indiﬀerent in their ﬁscal choices, the openness of a
12country and, thus, the degree of tax competition has an eﬀect on the tax structure
chosen by each government, as required by the Proposition. 
In models of tax competition with competitive labour markets the intuition for the
welfare enhancing impact of a coordinated increase in source-based capital taxation is
that a simultaneous tax increase in all jurisdictions prevents the tax-driven realloca-
tion of capital. In the presence of unemployment, the positive welfare eﬀects of tax
coordination are strengthened since coordination of capital taxation allows for a reduc-
tion of wage taxation and thereby increases employment. In this sense, labour market
imperfections and the mobility of tax bases are ‘additive’ in their eﬀects on welfare.
In a broader sense, measures of international tax coordination are not a substitute for
reforms of domestic labour markets. Instead, the globalisation of tax bases stresses the
need for such reforms.
To clarify the argument, let us shortly characterize ﬁscal policy in the benchmark of
a closed economy assuming that taxation of proﬁts is restricted. The structure of our
model implies that the source-based capital tax replicates the economic properties of a
tax on proﬁts when capital is internationally immobile. Then, Proposition 1 suggests
that the ﬁscal authority will use the lump-sum tax on the capital stock and a wage
subsidy to counteract the labour market imperfection. Let us now open the economy.
The government in an open economy taxes mobile capital according to Proposition 3.
However, the proﬁt tax must not be available to obtain this result. Hence, the ﬁscal
authority is not indiﬀerent between proﬁt and capital taxation. This argument clariﬁes
that the marginal costs of public funds in an open economy exceed the respective costs
in a closed economy. Turning to wage taxation, it is straightforward from Proposition 1
that it is proﬁtable to subsidise wages in a closed economy when a lump-sum tax on the
capital stock is available. Notice, that only the qualitative implications of this result
remain valid when the tax base of the capital tax becomes mobile. We know from
Proposition 4 that the government in an open economy subsidises wages only in cases
where the distortion caused by capital taxation is suﬃciently small. Hence, it may
be proﬁtable to counteract the labour market imperfection even in an open economy.
However, it becomes increasingly diﬃcult to raise the tax revenue required to subsidise
wage income. Notice that a basic reason for the revenue need could be overcome if the
labour market imperfection were to disappear.
134 Conclusions
In this paper we combined the implications of labour market imperfections due to
eﬃciency wages and internationally mobile capital for tax policy. Our main insights
are as follows. (i) The result that ﬁscal authorities chose a non-zero level of source-
based capital taxation does not speciﬁcally depend on the nature of the labour market
imperfection in the empirically perhaps most plausible case in which wages weakly
increase with the capital employed, but on the non-availability of a tax on proﬁts. The
result suggests that the source-based tax is used as an indirect tax on proﬁt income in
the absence of a direct tax on proﬁts. (ii) If proﬁts are zero, then it will not be proﬁtable
for ﬁscal authorities to choose a non-zero tax on mobile capital. In the presence of
untaxed proﬁts, however, it may (iii) be proﬁtable to use the tax revenue from source-
based capital taxation to subsidize wages in order to counteract the distortion on the
domestic labour market. (iv) Raising tax revenue will be increasingly diﬃcult if tax
bases become internationally mobile. This causes an increase in the welfare costs of a
tax policy which aims at counteracting the distortions on domestic markets. However,
labour market imperfections do not constitute a separate reason for tax coordination.
While this paper has focused on speciﬁc aspects of the interaction of tax competition
with unemployment, many issues are still left for future research. For instance, we have
assumed that individuals are identical. However, we observe heterogeneous individuals
which may diﬀer with respect to their abilities in the real world, and these diﬀerences
should also be taken into account when thinking about tax policy. An exogenous
capital supply which renders the residence-based capital income taxation lump-sum
may also be an important factor. We believe, however, that these extensions, while
valuable and worth pursuing are unlikely to change the basic mechanisms discussed
in this paper. For example, when residence-based capital taxation is sustainable in a
world with endogenous capital supply and decentralized tax setting, then the source-
based capital tax we considered would still be used as an indirect tax on proﬁts and
we would still obtain the result that coordination of capital taxes is not a substitute
for domestic reforms. To sum up, the simple model of the present paper allows to give
an answer to the question through which channels market integration may intensify
the detrimental eﬀects of labour market imperfections. Whether the globalisation of
markets is neutral to welfare, whether it increases or even reduces the welfare losses
from domestic market imperfections with asymmetric countries and individuals is an
interesting topic for future research.
14References
Boeters, S., and K. Schneider (1999) ‘Government versus union: the structure of opti-
mal taxation in a unionized labor market.’ Finanzarchiv 56, 174–187
Bucovetsky, S., and J.D. Wilson (1991) ‘Tax competition with two tax instruments.’
Regional Science and Urban Economics 21, 333–350
Diamond, P.A., and J.A. Mirrlees (1971) ‘Optimal taxation and public production.’
American Economic Review 61, 8–27 and 261–278
Fuest, C., and B. Huber (1999) ‘Tax coordination and unemployment.’ International
Tax and Public Finance 6, 7–26
Goerke, L. (2002) Taxes and unemployment (Kluwer Academic Publishers)
Guesnerie, R., and J.-J. Laﬀont (1978) ‘Taxing price makers.’ Journal of Economic
Theory 19, 423–455
Huizinga, H., and S. Nielsen (1997) ‘Capital income and proﬁt taxation with foreign
ownership of ﬁrms.’ Journal of International Economics 42, 149–165
Kleven, H.J., and P.B. Sørensen (1999) ‘Labour tax reform, the good jobs and the bad
jobs.’ EPRU working paper 1, 99
Konishi, H. (1990) ‘Final and intermediate goods taxes in an oligopolistic economy
with free entry.’ Journal of Public Economics 42, 371–386
Koskela, E., and R. Sch¨ ob (2002) ‘Optimal factor income taxation in the presence of
unemployment.’ Journal of Public Economic Theory. forthcoming
Myles, G.D. (1989) ‘Ramsey tax rules for economies with imperfect competition.’ Jour-
nal of Public Economics 38, 95–115
Picard, P.M., and E. Toulemonde (2001) ‘On the equivalence of taxes paid by employers
and employees.’ Scottish Journal of Political Economy 48, 461–470
Pissarides, C.A. (1998) ‘The impact of employment tax cuts on unemployment and
wages; the role of unemployment beneﬁts and tax structure.’ European Economic
Review 42, 155–183
15Razin, A., and E. Sadka (1991) ‘International tax competition and gains from tax
harmonization.’ Economics Letters 37, 69–76
Richter, W., and K. Schneider (2001) ‘Taxing mobile capital with labor market imper-
fections.’ International Tax and Public Finance 8, 245–262
Shapiro, C., and J. E. Stiglitz (1984) ‘Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline
device.’ American Economic Review 74, 433–444
Wilson, J.D. (1990) ‘The optimal taxation of internationally mobile capital in an eﬃ-
ciency wage model.’ In Taxation in the global economy, ed. A. Razin and J. Slemrod
(Chicago: Chicago University Press) chapter 11, pp. 397–432
16Titles published in EPRU's Working Paper Series, beginning in November 1993:
2002
02-01 Wolfgang Eggert and Martin Kolmar: Information Sharing, Multiple Nash Equilibria,
and Asymmetric Capital-Tax Competition
02-02 Carl-Johan Dalgaard and Claus Thustrup Kreiner: Endogenous Growth: A Knife-Edge
or the Razor’s Edge?
02-03 Marta Loi, Teresa Lloyd-Braga and Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen: Endogenous Business
Cycles and Systematic Stabilization Policy
02-04 Wolfgang Eggert and Martin Kolmar: Contests with Size Effects.
02-05 Wolfgang Eggert and Laszlo Goerke, Fiscal Policy, Economic Integration and
Unemployment.
2001
01-01 Henrik Jensen: Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking
01-02 Thorvaldur Gylfason and Gylfi Zoega: Natural Resources and Economic Growth: The
Role of Investment.
01-03 Wilhelm Kohler: International Fragmentation of Value-added Chains: How Does it
Affect Domestic Factor Prices?
01-04 Mark A. Roberts and Eric O’N. Fisher: Funded Pensions, Labor Market Participation,
and Economic Growth.
01-05 Søren Bo Nielsen, Pascalis Raimondos-Møller and Guttorm Schjelderup: Formula
Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition.
01-06 Christian Keuschnigg and Søren Bo Nielsen: Public Policy for Venture Capital.
01-07 Søren Bo Nielsen, Pascalis Raimondos-Møller, and Guttorm Schjelderup: Tax Spillovers
under Separate Accounting and Formula Apportionment
01-08 Peter Birch Sørensen: International Tax Coordination: Regionalism versus Globalism.
01-09 Michael M. Hutchison: A Cure Worse Than the Desease? Currency Crises and the
Output Costs of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs.
01-10 Rasmus Lenz and Torben Tranæs: Job Search and Savings: Wealth Effects and Duration
Dependence.
01-11 Dieter Bös: Bureaucrats and Public Procurement.01-12 Kala Krishna and Cemile Yavas: Wage Equality in a General Equilibrium Model with
Indivisibilities.
01-13 Mark A. Roberts: Funding the Transition from Pay-As-You-Go Pensions by Taxing
Capital Gains on Land.
01-14 Wilfred J. Ethier: Punishments and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements.
01-15 Peter Christoffersen, Eric Ghysels, and Norman R. Swanson: Let’s Get “Real” about
Using Economic Data.
01-16 James E. Alt, David Dreyer Lassen, and David Skilling: Fiscal Transparency,
Gubernatorial Popularity, and the Scale of Government: Evidence from the States
2000
00-01 Andrew Hughes Hallett and Maria Demertzis: When Can An Independent Central Bank
Offer Lower Inflation at No Cost? A Political Economy Analysis.
00-02 Torben M. Andersen: International Integration, Risk and the Welfare State.
00-03 F. Gulzin Ozkan, Anne Sibert and Alan Sutherland: Monetary Union, Entry Conditions
and Economic Reform.
00-04 Michael M. Hutchison: European Banking Distress and EMU: Institutional and
Macroeconomic Risks.
00-05 Bertil Holmlund: Labor Taxation in Search Equilibrium with Home Production.
00-06 Knud Jørgen Munk: Administrative Costs and the “Double Dividend”.
00-07 Carl-Johan Dalgaard and Claus Thustrup Hansen: Scale-Invariant Endogenous Growth.
00-08 A. Lans Bovenberg and Ben J. Heijdra: Environmental Abatement and Intergenerational
Distribution.
00-09 Jan Overgaard Olesen: A Simple Explanation of Stock Price Behaviour in the Long Run:
Evidence for Denmark.
00-10 John E. Roemer, Rolf Aaberge, Ugo Colombino, Johan Fritzell, Stephen P. Jenkins, Ive
Marx, Marianne Page, Evert Pommer, Javier Ruiz-Castillo, Maria Jesus San Segundo,
Torben Tranæs, Gert G. Wagner, and Ignacio Zubiri: To What Extent Do Fiscal Regimes
Equalize Opportunities for Income Acquisition among Citizens?
00-11 Christian Schultz and Tomas Sjöström: Local Public Goods, Debt and Migration.
00-12 Francesco Daveri: Is Growth an Information Technology Story in Europe Too?00-13 Peter F. Christoffersen: Dating the Turning Points of Nordic Business Cycles.
00-14 Reuven Glick and Michael M. Hutchison: Stopping “Hot Money” or Signalling Bad
Policy? Capital Controls and the Onset of Currency Crises.
00-15 Dan Anderberg and Carlo Perroni: Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule.
00-16 Henrik Jacobsen Kleven: Optimum Taxation and the Allocation of Time.
00-17 Clemens Fuest, Bernd Huber and Søren Bo Nielsen: Why Is the Corporate Tax Rate
Lower than the Personal Tax Rate?
00-18 Christian Keuschnigg and Søren Bo Nielsen: Tax Policy, Venture Capital, and
Entrepreneurship.
00-19 Harry Huizinga and Søren Bo Nielsen: Withholding Taxes or Information Exchange:
The Taxation of International Interest Flows.
00-20 David Dreyer Lassen: Political Accountability and the Size of Government: Theory and
Cross-Country Evidence.
1999
99-01 Henrik Jacobsen and Peter Birch Sørensen: Labour Tax Reform, The Good Jobs and the
Bad Jobs.
99-02 Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin and Christian Schultz: Divide the Dollar, A Model of Interregional
Redistributive Politics.
99-03 Pekka Ilmakunnas, Vesa Kanniainen, and Uki Lammi: Entrepreneurship, Economic
Risks, and Risk-Insurance in the Welfare State.
99-04 Niels Thygesen: Evolving Ambitions in Europe’s Monetary Unification.
99-05 Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos-Møller: Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid
Allocation.
99-06 Roel M.W.J. Beetsma and Henrik Jensen: Structural Convergence under Reversible and
Irreversible Monetary Unification.
99-07 Wolfgang Mayer and Pascalis Raimondos-Møller: The Politics of Foreign Aid.
99-08 Dermot Leahy and Catia Montagna: Temporary Social Dumping, Union Legalisation
and FDI: A Note on the Strategic Use of Standards.
99-09 Rasmus Fatum and Michael M. Hutchison: Is Sterilized Foreign Exchange Intervention
Effective After All? An Event Study Approach.99-10 Christian Schultz and Tomas Sjöström: Public Debt, Property Values and Migration.
99-11 Roel M.W.J. Beetsma and Henrik Jensen: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard with a
Stability Pact.
99-12 Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Wolfram F. Richter and Peter Birch Sørensen: Optimal
Taxation with Household Production.
99-13 Huw Dixon, Claus Thustrup Hansen and Henrik Jacobsen Kleven: Dual Labour Markets
and Menu Costs: Explaining the Cyclicality of Productivity and Wage Differentials.
99-14 Jim Malley and Hassan Molana: Fiscal Policy and the Composition of Private
Consumption: Some Evidence from the U.S. and Canada.
99-15 Jonas Agell and Per Lundborg: Survey Evidence on Wage Rigidity and Unemployment:
Sweden in the 1990s.
99-16 Satya P. Das: North-South Trade, Capital Accumulation and Personal Distribution of
Wealth and Income.
99-17 Holger Bonin, Bernd Raffelhüschen and Jan Walliser: Can Immigration Alleviate the
Demographic Burden?
99-18 Morten Hvidt and Søren Bo Nielsen: Noncooperative vs. Minimum-Rate Commodity
Taxation.
99-19 Lisandro Abrego and Carlo Perroni: Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent
Environmental Policy.
99-20 Reuven Glick and Michael M. Hutchison: Banking and Currency Crises: How Common
Are Twins?
99-21 Mark Gradstein and Moshe Justman: Public Schooling, Social Capital and Growth.
99-22 Jeremy S.S. Edwards and Alfons J. Weichenrieder: Ownership Concentration and Share
Valuation: Evidence from Germany.
99-23 Henrik Jensen: Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation?
99-24 Svend E. Hougaard Jensen and Thomas F. Rutherford: Distributional Effects of Fiscal
Consolidation.
1998
98-01 Pascalis Raimondos-Møller and Kimberley A. Scharf: The Optimal Design of Transfer
Pricing Rules: A Non-Cooperative Analysis.98-02 Michael Keen, Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos-Møller: When Is Policy
Harmonisation Desirable?
98-03 Clemens Fuest and Bernd Huber: Tax Progression and Human Capital in Imperfect
Labour Markets.
98-04 Frank Hettich and Minna Selene Svane: Environmental Policy in a Two Sector
Endogenous Growth Model.
98-05 Harry Huizinga and Søren Bo Nielsen: Is Coordination of Fiscal Deficits Necessary?
98-06 Claus Thustrup Hansen: A Note on Blanchard & Kiyotaki (1987).
98-07 Claus Thustrup Hansen: Long Run Impact of Increased Wage Pressure.
98-08 Erkki Koskela and Ronnie Schöb: Why Governments Should Tax Mobile Capital in the
Presence of Unemployment.
98-09 Mark A. Roberts: Unfunded Social Security in the OLG Model with an Imperfectly
Competitive Finance Market.
98-10 Peter Birch Sørensen: Tax Policy, the Good Jobs and the Bad Jobs.
98-11 Roel M.W.J. Beetsma and Henrik Jensen: Optimal Inflation Targets, “Conservative”
Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts: Comment.
98-12 Ole Risager: Random Walk or Mean Reversion: The Danish Stock Market Since World
War I.
98-13 João Ejarque and Torben Tranæs: Skill-Neutral Shocks and Institutional Changes:
Implications for Productivity Growth and Wage Dispersion.
98-14 Minna Selene Svane: Growth, Training Leave and Unemployment.
98-15 Svend E. Hougaard Jensen: Nominal Stability, Real Convergence, and Fiscal Transfers
in a Monetary Union.
98-16 U. Michael Bergman and Michael Hutchison: The Costs of EMU and Economic
Convergence.
98-17 Niels Thygesen: Fiscal Institutions in EMU and the Stability Pact.
98-18 Søren Bo Nielsen: A Simple Model of Commodity Taxation and Cross-Border Shopping.
98-19 Christian Schultz: Monetary Policy, Delegation and Polarization.
98-20 Knud Jørgen Munk: Should Governments Create Production Inefficiency?98-21 Syed M. Ahsan and Panagiotis Tsigaris: The Public Discount Rate and the Uncertain
Budgetary Flows.
98-22 Minna Selene Svane: Emission Standards and Growth.
1997
97-01 Harry Huizinga and Søren Bo Nielsen: The Political Economy of Capital Income and
Profit Taxation in a Small Open Economy.
97-02 Torsten Sløk and Jens Peter Sørensen: How Small Shocks and Heterogeneous
Expectations Can Create Swings in the Exchange Rate.
97-03 Thórarinn G. Pétursson and Torsten Sløk: Wage Formation in a Cointegrated VAR
Model: A Demand and Supply Approach.
97-04 Jeffrey H. Nilsen: Borrowed Reserves, Fed Funds Rate Targets, and the Term Structure.
97-05 Carlo Perroni and Kimberley A. Scharf: Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition
and Constitutional Choices.
97-06 Sajal Lahiri, Pascalis Raimondos-Møller, Kar-yiu Wong, and Alan D. Woodland:
Optimal Income Transfers and Tariffs.
97-07 Claus Thustrup Hansen and Hans Jørgen Jacobsen: Rebalancing Unemployment Benefits
in a Unionized Labour Market.
97-08 Sören Blomquist and Vidar Christiansen: Price Subsidies versus Public Provision.
97-09 Amrita Dhillon, Carlo Perroni and Kimberley A. Scharf: Implementing Tax
Coordination.
97-10 Peter Birch Sørensen: Optimal Tax Progressivity in Imperfect Labour Markets.
97-11 Syed M. Ahsan and Peter Tsigaris: The Design of a Consumption Tax under Capital
Risk.
97-12 Claus Thustrup Hansen and Søren Kyhl: Pay-per-view Television: Consequences of a
Ban.
97-13 Harry Huizinga and Søren Bo Nielsen: The Taxation of Interest in Europe: A Minimum
Withholding Tax?
97-14 Harry Huizinga and Søren Bo Nielsen: A Welfare Comparison of International Tax
Regimes with Cross-Ownership of Firms.
97-15 Pascalis Raimondos-Møller and Alan D. Woodland: Tariff Strategies and Small Open
Economies.97-16 Ritva Tarkiainen and Matti Tuomala: On Optimal Income Taxation with Heterogenous
Work Preferences.
97-17 Minna Selene Svane: Optimal Taxation in a Two Sector Model of Endogenous Growth.
97-18 Frank Hettich: Growth Effects of a Revenue Neutral Environmental Tax Reform.
97-19 Erling Steigum, Jr.: Fiscal Deficits, Asset Prices and Intergenerational Distribution in
an Open Unionized Economy.
97-20 Rod Falvey and Geoff Reed: Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments.
97-21 U. Michael Bergman, Michael M. Hutchison and Yin-Wong Cheung: Should the Nordic
Countries Join A European Monetary Union? An Empirical Analysis.
97-22 Kenneth M. Kletzer: Macroeconomic Stabilization with a Common Currency: Does
European Monetary Unification Create a Need for Fiscal Insurance or Federalism?
97-23 Martin Richardson: Trade Policy and Access to Retail Distribution.
97-24 Sugata Marjit and Hamid Beladi: Protection, Underemployment and Welfare.
97-25 Bernd Huber: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in an Optimum Income Tax
Model.
97-26 Clemens Fuest and Bernd Huber: Tax Coordination and Unemployment.
97-27 Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka, and Chi-Wa Yuen: Quantitative Implications of the Home
Bias: Foreign Underinvestment, Domestic Oversaving, and Corrective Taxation.
97-28 Mark A. Roberts, Karsten Stæhr, and Torben Tranæs: Two-Stage Bargaining with
Coverage Extension in a Dual Labour Market.
1996
96-01 Torben Tranæs: A Simple Model of Raiding Opportunities and Unemployment.
96-02 Kala Krishna and Ling Hui Tan: Transferable Licenses vs. Nontransferable Licenses:
What is the Difference?
96-03 Jiandong Ju and Kala Krishna: Market Access and Welfare Effects of Free Trade. Areas
without Rules of Origin.
96-04 Anders Sørensen: Growth Enhancing Policies in a Small Open Economy.
96-05 Anders Sørensen: Industrialization and Factor Accumulation.
96-06 Christian Schultz: Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy.96-07 Christian Schultz: Political Competition and Polarization.
96-08 Ole Risager and William G. Tyler: Macroeconomic Policy and Exchange Rate Policy
Management in a Small Dependent Economy: Estimating the Effects of Currency
Devaluation in Jordan.
96-09 Neil Rankin: How Does Uncertainty About Future Fiscal Policy Affect Current
Macroeconomic Variables?
96-10 U. Michael Bergman and Michael M. Hutchison: The ￿German View’, Fiscal
Consolidation and Consumption Booms: Empirical Evidence from Denmark.
96-11 Eric Hansen and Michael M. Hutchison: Exchange Rates, Non-traded Goods and the
Terms-of-Trade: An Empirical Application for New Zealand.
96-12 Michael M. Hutchison and Carl E. Walsh: Central Bank Institutional Design and the
Output Cost of Disinflation: Did the 1989 New Zealand Reserve Bank Act Affect the
Inflation-Output Tradeoff?
96-13 Rasmus Fatum and Michael M. Hutchison: Is Intervention a Signal of Future Monetary
Policy? Evidence from the Federal Funds Futures Market.
96-14 Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson and Anders Sørensen: Policy Rules for Exploitation of
Renewable Resources: A Macroeconomic Perspective.
96-15 Anders Sørensen: International Welfare Effects from Country-Specific R&D Subsidies.
96-16 Andreas Haufler and Søren Bo Nielsen: Dynamic Effects of an Anticipated Switch from
Destination- to Origin-Based Commodity Taxation.
96-17 Harry Huizinga and Søren Bo Nielsen: The Coordination of Capital Income and Profit
Taxation with Cross-Ownership of Firms.
96-18 Svend Erik Hougaard Jensen: Wage Rigidity, Monetary Integration and Fiscal
Stabilisation in Europe.
96-19 Ole Risager and Jan Rose Sørensen: Job Security Policies and Trade Union Behaviour
in an Open Economy.
96-20 Slobodan Djajic, Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos-Møller: Transfer and the
Intertemporal Terms of Trade.
96-21 Slobodan Djajic, Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos-Møller: Logic of Aid in an
Intertemporal Setting.
96-22 Svend E. Hougaard Jensen and Bernd Raffelhüschen: Public Debt, Welfare Reforms, and
Intergenerational Distribution of Tax Burdens in Denmark.1995
95-01 Vesa Kanniainen and Jan Södersten: On Financial Adjustment and Investment Booms:
Lessons from Tax Reforms.
95-02 Søren Bo Nielsen: Withholding Taxes and Country-Specific Shocks.
95-03 Vesa Kanniainen and Rune Stenbacka: Towards a Theory of Socially Valuable Imitation
with Implications for Technology Policy.
95-04 Bent E. Sørensen, Pierfederico Asdrubali, and Oved Yosha: Channels of Interstate
Risksharing: US 1963-1990.
95-05 Peter Birch Sørensen: Changing Views of the Corporate Income Tax.
95-06 Robin Boadway: The Role of Second-Best Theory in Public Economics.
95-07 Sjak Smulders: Environmental Policy and Sustainable Economic Growth - an
endogenous growth perspective.
95-08 Bernd Genser: Patterns of Tax Arbitrage and Decentralized Tax Autonomy.
95-09 Harry Huizinga and Søren Bo Nielsen: Capital Income and Profits Taxation with
Foreign Ownership of Firms.
95-10 Ben Lockwood: Commodity Tax Harmonisation with Public Goods - an Alternative
Perspective.
95-11 Saqib Jafarey, Yannis Kaskarelis, and Apostolis Philippopoulos: Private Investment and
Endogenous Fiscal Policy. Theory and Evidence from UK and USA.
95-12 Svend Erik Hougaard Jensen: Debt Reduction, Wage Formation and Intergenerational
Welfare.
95-13 Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos: Public Good Provision and the Welfare Effects of
Indirect Tax Harmonisation.
95-14 Ruud A. de Mooij and A. Lans Bovenberg: Environmental Taxes, International Capital
Mobility and Inefficient Tax Systems: Tax Burden vs. Tax Shifting.
95-15 David F. Bradford: Consumption Taxes: Some Fundamental Transition Issues.
95-16 Ole Risager: On the Effects of Trade Policy Reform: The Case of Jordan.
95-17 Niels Thygesen: The Prospects for EMU by 1999 - and Reflections on Arrangements for
the Outsiders.
95-18 Christian Keuschnigg and Søren Bo Nielsen: Housing Markets and Vacant Land.
95-19 Hans Fehr: Welfare Effects of Investment Incentive Policies: A Quantitative Assessment.95-20 Ben Lockwood, Torsten Sløk, and Torben Tranæs: Progressive Taxation and Wage
Setting: Some Evidence for Denmark.
95-21 Claus Thustrup Hansen, Lars Haagen Pedersen, and Torsten Sløk: Progressive Taxation,
Wages and Activity in a Small Open Economy.
95-22 Svend Erik Hougaard Jensen and Bernd Raffelhüschen: Intertemporal Aspects of Fiscal
Policy in Denmark.
1994
94-01 Niels Thygesen: Reinforcing Stage Two in the EMU Process.
94-02 Kåre P. Hagen and Vesa Kanniainen: Optimal Taxation of Intangible Capital.
94-03 Ed W.M.T. Westerhout: The Economic and Welfare Effects of Taxing Foreign Assets.
94-04 Slobodan Djajic: Illegal Immigration and Resource Allocation.
94-05 Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos: Is There Anything Wrong with Tied-Aid?
94-06 Ben Lockwood, Apostolis Philippopoulos, and Andy Snell: Fiscal Policy, Public Debt
Stabilzation and Politics: Theory and evidence from the US and UK.
94-07 Partha Sen: Welfare-Improving Debt Policy under Monopolistic Competition.
94-08 Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos: Tying of Aid to Trade Policy Reform and Welfare.
94-09 Mark Gradstein and Moshe Justman: Public Choice of an Education System and its
Implications for Growth and Income Distribution.
94-10 Peter Birch Sørensen, Lars Haagen Pedersen, and Søren Bo Nielsen: Taxation, Pollution,
Unemployment and Growth: Could there be a "Triple Dividend" from a Green Tax
Reform?
94-11 Peter Birch Sørensen and Søren Bo Nielsen: On the Optimality of the Nordic System of
Dual Income Taxation.
94-12 Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos: Competition for Aid and Trade Policy.
94-13 Niels Kleis Frederiksen, Peter Reinhard Hansen, Henrik Jacobsen, and Peter Birch
Sørensen: Comsumer Services, Employment and the Informal Economy.
94-14 Yoshiyasu Ono: Market Segmentation and Effective Demand Shortage in a World with
Dynamic Optimization.
1993
93-01 Svend Erik Hougaard Jensen, Søren Bo Nielsen, Lars Haagen Petersen and Peter Birch
Sørensen:  Tax Reform, Welfare, and Intergenerational Redistribution - An
Intertemporal Simulation Approach.93-02 Bernd Genser, Andreas Haufler and Peter Birch Sørensen: Indirect Taxation in an
Integrated Europe. Is there a Way of Avoiding Trade Distortions Without Sacrificing
National Tax Autonomy?
93-03 Svend Erik Hougaard Jensen and Lars Grue Jensen: Debt, Deficits and Transition to
EMU: A Small Country Analysis.
93-04 Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini: Federal Fiscal Constitutions. Part I: Risk Sharing
and Moral Hazard.
93-05 Martin Paldam: The Political Economy of Stopping High Inflation.
93-06 Roger H. Gordon and Jeffrey K. Mackie-Mason: Why is There Corporate Taxation in
a Small Open Economy? The Role of Transfer Pricing and Income Shifting.
93-07 Peter Birch Sørensen: From the Global Income Tax To the Dual Income Tax: Recent
Tax Reforms in The Nordic Countries.
93-08 Wilhelm Kohler: Strategic Trade Policy and Integration.
93-09 F. Gulcin Ozkan and Alan Sutherland: A Model of the ERM Crisis.